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If ‘knowledge is power’, it is unsurprising that the production, legitimation, and
application of social scientific knowledge, not least that which was designed to harness
social organization to economic growth, is a potentially contentious process. Coping
with, adapting to, or attempting to shape globalization has emerged as a central concern
of policy-makers who are, therefore, interested in knowledge to assist their managerial
activities. Thus, an organization that can create, synthesize, legitimate, and disseminate
useful knowledge can play a significant role in the emerging global governance system.
The OECD operates as one important site for the construction, standardization, and
dissemination of transnational policy ideas. OECD staff conducts research and produces
a range of background studies and reports, drawing on disciplinary knowledge (typically
economics) supplemented by their ‘organizational discourses’. This paper probes the
contested nature of knowledge production and attempts to evaluate the impact of the
OECD’s efforts to produce globally applicable policy advice. Particular attention is paid
to important initiatives in the labour market and social policy fields – the Jobs Study
and Babies and Bosses.
Keywords: global governance; OECD; neo-liberalism

Introduction
Although nation states still formulate policies, they do so in the context of an
increasingly dense web of transnational networks, operating at different scales, with
different, often overlapping mandates. International organizations such as the OECD
function as important nodes in these networks, which, taken as a whole, constitute an
uneven, incomplete, and contested system of transnational governance. The OECD is
a little studied international organization that has been described in various terms:
‘rich man’s club’, international think tank or even ‘shared state apparatus’ (Dostal,
2004). Formed in the heyday of the Keynesian-welfare state,1 the OECD initially

* Email: prmahon@rogers.com
1
The OECD was formed out of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) established in the immediate postwar period to aid in the reconstruction and integration of Western Europe.
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emphasized the coordination of members’ policies but later, this gave way to a focus
on establishing ‘best practices’ (Wolfe, 2008). As the postwar order began to unravel,
the OECD altered its horizons geo-politically through the expansion of its membership, initially including Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, but later moving to
admit former members of the Soviet bloc and a leading ‘Asian tiger’ (South Korea).
Although it has always played a role in coordinating its members’ development
assistance programmes, more recently the OECD has intensified its outreach
activities, especially to the major economies of Asia and Latin America. The
current Secretary-General aims to make the OECD a ‘globalization hub’.
Accordingly, at the 2007 meeting of the Council of Ministers, the OECD extended
an invitation to Chile, Estonia, Israel, Russia, and Slovenia, while recommending
increased ‘engagement’ with Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa.
The OECD deserves more attention than it normally receives in the analyses of
transnational governance. To be sure, in contrast with the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the World Bank, the
OECD lacks the power to enforce compliance with its decisions. Yet, it is much
less concerned with establishing binding obligations than it is with influencing
the direction of policy, in ways that may in the future become binding on states,
but not necessarily through the OECD itself. The OECD thus operates as an
important site for the construction and dissemination of transnational research
and policy ideas embracing a wide range of contemporary issues. Such ideas play
an important role in contemporary transnational governance. In the broadest
sense, transnational norms identify what a modern state ‘is’ and thus sanction
appropriate modes of internal and external conduct (Porter and Webb, 2008). In
policy terms, the ideas sanctioned by international organizations help to identify
problems and to map out the range of ‘best practice’ solutions. The first two
sections of this article explore the OECD’s meditative and inquisitive functions
(Jacobsson, 2006), highlighting their important contribution to the increasingly
dense webs of transnational governance.
The OECD has proved to be flexible in its role as creator, purveyor, and legitimator
of ideas, adding and shedding functions as the times and new challenges required.
In doing so, it has shifted its position, both reflecting and contributing to larger
ideological shifts. Although the OECD originally helped to consolidate the norms
associated with the postwar settlement (Keynesian welfare states committed to the
liberalization of trade and capital flows), in the late 1970s, it began to foster the
spread of neo-liberal solutions.
The change of paradigm meant recasting the goals and contents of both economic and social policies, a process that displaced the Keynesian compromise
between economic and social priorities. Such a shift could be expected to reveal
differences between and within member nations, rooted in social constituencies
and bureaucratic agencies, and within the OECD itself. Moreover, such tensions
alerted us to the possibility of ongoing changes in the OECD’s thinking, either
within or beyond the parameters of the established paradigm. In the third section,
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therefore, we explore these ideological shifts, focusing on two cases that illustrate
these differences and serve to generate hypotheses for further research. The first
was the ‘Jobs Strategy’, which single-mindedly pushed a form of neo-liberal
flexibilization that undermined the workers’ rights. In the early 1990s, the OECD
also helped to disseminate the critique of the welfare state as ‘burden’. More
recently, however, its Directorate for Employment, Labour, and Social Affairs
(DELSA) has argued for social policies in support of activation. This policy turn,
which, following Craig and Porter (2004), we label ‘inclusive liberalism’, has a
marked gender and generational dimension, focused as it is on promoting women’s
labour market participation and investing in youth and children. Accordingly, the
second case selected is ‘Babies and Bosses’, an important study of measures to
promote the reconciliation of work and family life, launched in 2001, with its final
report released in 2007.

Beyond methodological nationalism: the growth of transnational governance
In international relations and policy studies, as in much of modern social science,2 the
dominant approaches have long been rooted in a ‘methodological nationalism’ – the
assumption that ‘all social relations are organized at a national scale or are undergoing processes of nationalization’ (Brenner, 2004: 28). However, policy studies have
increasingly come to recognize the importance of inter- and transnational policy
transfer and policy learning. The increased incidence of policy transfer is seen
partially as a product of advances in information communication technologies’
ability to diffuse information rapidly across time and space, and partially as a consequence of the increasing coordination of policy through international arenas. The
policy transfer literature draws attention to the ways in which seemingly closed
national policy routines can be ‘disrupted’ by the policy prescriptions of inter- and
supra-national organizations, as well as by the expertise supplied by transnational
consultants. In some accounts, lesson drawing is considered a rational, voluntary
activity. There is also the important question of the extent to which transfer is always
‘voluntary’ or even necessarily ‘rational’ (James and Lodge, 2003).
The twentieth century witnessed the proliferation of international organizations, and it is increasingly recognized that these are more than mere ‘empty shells
or impersonal policy machinery to be manipulated by other actors’ (Barnett
and Finnemore, 1999: 704). As a result, interest has grown in transnational
(Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2006a, b) governance. The term ‘transnational’
captures the complex patchwork of networks, operating at variable scales, which
together comprise the contemporary system. As Robert Cox (2005: 149) argued,
‘The old state system is resolving itself into a complex of political–economic
2
Some might argue that the ‘world systems’ approach escaped such methodological nationalism, yet
the world as imagined by these theorists was still a relatively simple one, composed of the said ‘world
system’ and core and peripheral states.
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entities: micro-regions, traditional states and macro-regions with institutions
of greater or lesser functional scope and formal authority’. In other words,
transnational networks, whether supra-national structures such as the European
Union or the much more limited North American Free Trade Agreement, define a
new porous and variable territoriality, (macro)regional in scope. At the same
time, cities and other sub-national governments have gained a new international
visibility as centres of important ‘micro-regions’ or as ‘global cities’. Nation states
still matter, but their boundaries are being increasingly recognized as permeable.
The choice of the word ‘governance’ is also deliberate. It refers to ‘governance
without government’ (Cox’s famous ‘nébuleuse’), that is, the development, at
multiple scales, of a variety of mechanisms of regulation, operating in the absence
of an overarching political authority. The absence of formal hierarchy, in turn,
suggests the utilization of ‘soft’ as well as ‘hard’ (i.e., formal laws and directives)
regulation. ‘Epistemic communities’ (Haas, 1992) or networks of knowledgebased experts – sometimes operating through international organizations, other
times through informal networks – are engaged in identifying state interests and/
or common problems to be tackled in a coordinated manner. In addition, ‘social
forces’ (Cox, 1987) contribute to the construction/transformation of structures of
transnational governance.
Thus, in addition to classic regulation, with formal laws or directives backed by
penalties for violation, the emergent system of transnational governance includes
inquisitive and meditative modes of regulation (Jacobsson, 2006), in which the
OECD is heavily involved. Inquisitive regulation involves surveillance or monitoring
the actions of states. Accordingly, practices such as establishing benchmarks and the
organization of peer review processes entail the auditing, comparison, and ranking
of state practices. The OECD has been an innovator in developing such international
peer review exercises. Formal international organizations play an important role in
inquisitorial activities, and their activities are supplemented by the work of quasiformal networks such as the G8, and private actors such as international bond rating
agencies (see Sinclair, 2005) and international cartels. In many cases, the OECD
acts as its own inquisitor, in which members’ performance is gauged against
the best practices and recommendations that emerge from the organization’s
meditative activities.
Meditative activities ‘are mainly framed as discussions among experts about
what is the best way or ways of doing something’ (Jacobsson, 2006: 208). It is
from such ‘meditative’ fora that hard regulations frequently emerge and from
which the standards or ‘benchmarks’ that constitute the stuff of inquisitions are
derived. The meditative function can be viewed as contributing to the construction of broad paradigms (see Hall, 1993) that, once adopted, shape subsequent
policy choices and their implementation. As Jacobsson and Sundstrom (2007)
suggest, international organizations are ‘important actors in the making of these
discourses. They act as ‘‘hosts’’, making sure that representatives of states not only
read the same documents, but also meet recurrently to discuss the various issues;
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they have a kind of meditative function’. Indeed, the role of international
organizations may be more active than that which is suggested by the role of
‘hosts’, disseminating documents, and convening meetings to discuss them and
draw out the implications for action. Certainly, in the OECD’s case, many of the
‘documents to be read’ are products of the OECD’s formidable research capacity.
The OECD employs a substantial staff of in-house experts and from this base
organizes transnational networks of researchers in numerous fields.
This does not mean that nation states have disappeared. They remain as
key decision points, though they make policy in a context increasingly shaped by
multiple and overlapping transnational networks. Although some forms of policy
transfer entail direct or indirect measures of coercion, transnational governance,
especially as it is applied to advanced capitalist countries, more typically takes the
form of policy learning. It should not, however, be assumed that such learning is
merely a rote exercise (though it may be), through which policy and programme
models are imported from elsewhere and applied in a procrustean manner. Rather, as
Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson (2006a: 15–16) suggest, ‘the travel of ideas is an active
process and ideas are shaped and translated differently in different settings. Carriers
are active in structuring flows and patterns of diffusion but they are also translating
the ideas they mediate, reflecting in the process their own projects and interests’.
The emphasis on ‘soft’ instruments of governance and transnational networks
does not mean the absence of power and contestation. Clearly, meditative activities channelled through international organizations involve the power to classify,
fix meanings, and diffuse norms (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 711), whereas
inquisitive processes, such as peer reviews, entail the exercise of the power of
surveillance/monitoring, creating pressures on states to conform to new standards
and practices. The dominant norms and ideas are decidedly ‘Western’, that is,
individual human rights, modern bureaucracy as the paramount form of political
organization (Finnemore, 1996: 332), and also liberal economic theory and its
definition of efficient economic organization (market economies). The terminology of neo-Gramscians may be different – bourgeois individualism, capitalist
relations of production – but it points in the same direction. However, power
needs to be understood in relational terms. The existence of deep tensions in
globalized Western culture leaves ample room for contestation over ‘the logic of
appropriateness’. It is important, therefore, to recognize the implications such
contestation holds for international organizations.

The OECD in the emerging structure of transnational governance
The OECD’s work does not focus on classic foreign policy issues, nor does it
possess the budgetary or sanctioning powers enjoyed by the main economic
international organizations, the IMF and the World Bank. Unlike the International Labour Organization (ILO), whose conventions have to be submitted to
parliaments (Armingeon, 2004: 227), governments can merely choose to ignore
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the OECD’s advice. Nonetheless, the OECD did play an instrumental role in
developing the ‘inquisitive’ and ‘meditative’ modes of (Western) governance in the
postwar period. Furthermore, the OECD Secretariat3 enjoys a certain autonomy
vis-à-vis both transnational social forces and member states, including the most
powerful (the US) among them. That autonomy, however, is only relative.
Although the IMF and the World Bank were charged with the provision
of short-term loans to relieve balance of payment difficulties and longer term
loans for ‘development’, the OECD initially focused on surveillance of economic
policies and outcomes in the North Atlantic, with an eye to harmonization. As
Cox (1986: 231) noted, ‘such procedures began with the mutual criticism of
reconstruction plans in Western European countries (the US condition for
Marshall Plan funds), continued with the development of annual review procedure in NATOyand became an acquired habit of mutual consultation and
mutual review of national policies (through the OECD and other agencies)’. In
fact, it was the OECD’s predecessor, the OEEC, which was created to manage this
process. As Wolfe (2008) argues, the OEEC was unable to play the role – allocation of Marshall Plan aid – initially envisaged by the Americans. From 1948 to
1958, however, the OEEC successfully4 worked to remove quantitative trade
restrictions in Europe. Moreover, it helped lay the foundations for the European
Economic Community and the European Free Trade Association (Salzman and
Terracino, 2006: 315), whereas the European Payments Union it formed worked
to secure currency convertibility in Western Europe (Porter and Webb, 2008: 2).
Formed in 1961, the OECD went on to develop and refine techniques for the
surveillance of member countries’ economic performance, and the assessment
of their policies across a growing range of fields. Article 3 of its convention
committed member states ‘to furnish the Organization with the information
necessary for the accomplishment of its tasks’. This commitment formed the basis
for the routine collection of statistics from member (and, increasingly, nonmember) countries, and their assembly into regular reports such as the Economic
Outlook (Economics Department) or ‘Society at a Glance’, produced by the
DELSA. Such activities are routine, however, only in the sense that they form one
of the organization’s regular, ongoing activities. The OECD Secretariat plays an
active role here, identifying ‘appropriate’ indicators and developing common
ways of measuring in order to permit cross-national comparison and ranking. The
‘league tables’, thus constructed, make visible each country’s performance relative
to that of its peers, putting pressure on ‘laggards’ to improve their performance.

3
The OECD has a staff of about 2000. Approximately 800 of these are professionals, 40 percent of
whom are economists. Initially, the intent was to recruit middle and higher level civil servants on a 5-year
rotation from the member states, but Salzman and Terracino suggest that ‘many in the secretariat make
their careers at the OECD’ (2006: 324).
4
By 1961, only 5% of European trade – mainly in the area of agriculture – was subject to quantitative
restrictions (Sullivan, 1997).
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Sometimes inquisition involves more elaborate activities. For instance, the PISA
student performance assessments require participating countries to administer a
specific examination procedure, designed by a network of experts, coordinated by
the Directorate for Education. The biennial country surveys produced by the
Economics Department involve the ongoing engagement of OECD staff with their
national counterparts. As this methodology is applied, more or less systematically,
in other OECD studies, it is worth considering in greater detail.
The production of a country report begins with the design of a questionnaire,
prepared by the country desk in the Economics Department of the Secretariat. The
questions posed ‘direct their attention to a set of problem areas that the OECD
finds interesting. The questionnaire also provides a vocabulary introduced by the
OECD, which conceptualizes the problems and limits the margin of manoeuvre
for member countries’ (Noaksson and Jacobsson, 2003: 32). The country under
review is obliged to answer the questionnaire, and thus to enter into the mental
framework established by the Secretariat. The next step is a visit by the OECD
mission, which involves meetings with key ministries, the central bank, appropriate domestic experts, and relevant civil society representatives. In addition, it
enables the OECD team to establish/reinforce links with like-minded domestic
officials, creating a potential basis of support for the recommendations to be
contained in the final report.5
Up to this point, the process is led by the Department, which engages in a
‘bilateral’ dialogue with its member country counterparts, especially the key
economic ministry (usually the department of finance). The completion of the
next draft launches the peer review process, drawing-in representatives of other
member states. The draft report, which ‘can be quite explicit with pointed
recommendations and detailed case studies’ (Salzman and Terracino, 2006: 319),
is distributed 4 weeks in advance of the meeting of the Economic Development
and Review Committee (EDRC). Two peer reviewers are appointed to lead the
discussions, which can involve quite sharp debates with the country under review
seeking to blunt criticism, especially in domestically sensitive areas. The whole
debate takes place under the rule of ‘derestriction’: that is, no publication can be
released until all – both the country under review and its peer-critics – agree
(Salzman and Terracino, 2006: 319).6 The final report released to the public, thus,
typically represents a compromise, which the Secretariat often plays an active part
in reaching (Noaksson and Jacobsson, 2003).
The production of the country reviews, thus, constitutes a classic example of
the inquisitive mode of governance in operation. A similar procedure is followed

5
There is often a second visit, following the production of the interim report, to enable the team to
update information and engage in more protracted discussions with national officials (Schäfer, 2006: 74).
6
Sullivan (1997: 491) suggests that some reports have been held up for months, as the country under
inspection tries to persuade staff and fellow committee members to adopt a different tone, or to change
prescriptions, whereas Salzman and Terracino suggest that some reports are never published (2006: 319).
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by other parts of the OECD Secretariat in conducting other reviews or special
thematic studies, such as the regulatory review launched by the Directorate on
Governance and Territorial Development (GOV) in 1997 (Lodge, 2005). Just how
effective is this process, however, in inducing conformity on the part of the
member states?
The Armingeon and Beyeler (2004) volume examines the impact of the OECD
country reports on the social policies of its Western European members. Armingeon
concludes that the OECD’s advice enjoyed ‘low efficacity’. Even where there
appeared to be a strong link between OECD recommendations and member
country policy, such as the UK, there was little evidence that the OECD set the
agenda for change. Recent in-depth studies of education reform in Belgium, Hungary, and Portugal, however, show that negative PISA rankings helped to trigger or
accelerate the reform process (Bajoni, Berenzi, and Neuman, 2007; Barroso et al.,
2007; Delvaux et al., 2007). Certainly, a significant group of countries prospered
inspite of not following the OECD Jobs Strategy’s prescription for the ‘liberalization’ of domestic labour markets. Yet, as Grinvalds (2008) suggests, even
countries such as Denmark, that refused to tow its line, introduced reforms.
The OECD’s main contribution to transnational governance may, however, be its
‘meditative’ function. Here, its formidable research capacity is brought into play. Its
research enables it to highlight certain trends, to identify common problems, and to
map out a range of appropriate solutions. This can involve complex technical work,
which allows the broadening of the range of statistical surveillance by factoring new
data into the equation.7 Sometimes, the concepts thus produced facilitate the
coordination of member country activities vis-à-vis non-members. Occasionally,
practical concepts originating at the OECD migrate into agreements sanctioned by
other international organizations. Thus for instance, Sullivan credits the OECD’s
Environment Directorate with devising the concept of ‘polluter pays’ (1997). Wolfe
(2008) argues that the Trade Directorate and the Trade Committee’s work on the
concepts of producer and consumer subsidy equivalents, laid the basis for the
‘aggregate measure of support’ breakthrough at the WTO.
Such ‘meditation’ does not, however, take place in circumstances equivalent to
that of the proverbial ‘ivory tower’: ‘ethnographic studies of international organizations (IOs) describe a world in which organizational goals are strongly shaped
by norms of the profession that dominate the bureaucracy and in which interests
themselves are varied, often in flux, debated, and worked out through interactions
between the staff of the bureaucracy and the world in which they are embedded’
(Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 706). This accurately describes how the OECD
performs its meditative function. OECD staff conducts research and produces a
range of background studies and reports. In this, they draw on their disciplinary
7
One such example is the work behind the new ‘SOCX’ database, which, inter alia, enables the
analysis of the wider field of ‘social benefits’, including those provided by private institutions. Willem
Adema’s work has been instrumental here.
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knowledge, supplemented by what Dostal (2004: 445) refers to as an ‘organizational discourse’ – ‘claims encapsulating long-term political projects as defined by
the organization in question’. The latter reflects the effects of organizational
learning. Thus, an ethnographic account of a directorate would map the way key
studies and policy documents produce important themes and concepts, which
infiltrate and modify its ‘pure’ disciplinary discourse. As we shall see, the ‘Jobs
Strategy’ became such a key document/learning experience for the Economics
Department.
Such learning does not occur purely ‘in house’ of course. Research directions
and priorities are set by the managing committee to which each directorate
reports; below this is a myriad of sub-committees, working and expert groups that
regularly bring OECD staff into dialogue with national officials and other experts
in their field (Salzman and Terracino, 2006: 324). Sahlin-Andersson (2000) has
examined the way in which the Public Management Committee (PUMA) of the
Governance Directorate helped codify and disseminate the themes of ‘new public
management’, an amalgam of public choice theory, principal-agency theory, and
transaction cost economics, given practical significance by the public sector
reforms instituted in the Anglo-Saxon countries, especially New Zealand, during
the 1980s. She argues that PUMA’s actions involved the ‘editing out’ of countryspecific experience to produce generalizable conclusions.
The OECD’s ‘policy learning networks’ also include representatives of civil
society. From the outset, the OECD has been involved in a regular dialogue with
the Business Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) and the Trade Union Advisory
Committee (TUAC).8 Both regularly consult with the OECD Secretariat and the
various committees and working groups. The two associations can also discuss
OECD agenda items through the Labour/Management Programme, which is
partly financed by the OECD (Salzman and Terracino, 2006: 329). More broadly,
although the Committee for Agriculture and the Environmental Directorate have
long had relations with civil society groups, the MAI fiasco spurred the OECD to
develop greater dialogue with civil society representatives, although this proceeded selectively and unevenly. Thus, although the Agriculture, Environment,
and (now) Investment Committees have been actively engaged, the Economic
Policy Committee (ECO) remains aloof from such civil society consultations. Yet,
as Sullivan suggests, it is ECO – and its highly influential Working Party 3 (WP3) –
that is in charge of key routines, including the working-out of common policies in
advance of the annual G-7 (now G-8) summits (1997: 62).9 This suggests that the

8
TUAC’s origins date back to the immediate postwar period, when it was created ‘to provide advice
to the OEEC in its implementation of the Marshall Plan’ (Salzman and Terracino, 2006: 327). Mindful of
the tide of worker revolts in the aftermath of World War I and fearing the spread of communism, Western
leaders were keen to involve unions in postwar reconstruction. BIAC’s birth coincides with that of the
OECD.
9
It became eight with the addition of Russia.
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‘inner sanctum’ – the site where the most important economic policy issues are
dealt with – remains relatively insulated from civil society.
What of the OECD’s relationship with non-member states? From the outset, the
OECD functioned as a key node in the construction of the North Atlantic alliance
against the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe. With the latter’s disintegration in the
late 1980s, the OECD joined other IOs in facilitating the transition to market
economies. According to Sullivan (1997: 45), ‘a key element in the programy[was]
SIGMA – Support for Improvement of Governance and Management in Central
and Eastern European Countries, run jointly by the OECD and the European
Union’. Through SIGMA, the Economic Development and Review Committee
prepared reports on eastern European countries, ‘essentially bringing those nonmember states into the OECD surveillance process’ (Williams, 2008). These reports
focused on issues of appropriate forms of public sector management for the
emerging market economies. In the 1990s, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland were admitted to the OECD, with the Slovak Republic following in 2000.
Their admission to the ‘club’ marked their ‘progress’ towards the establishment of
market economies and liberal democracies.
It is in its relation to the global south that the OECD especially stands out as a
‘rich nation’s club’. In contrast to UN agencies, the OECD has offered its member
states a safe forum to explore common interests of the (capitalist) North vis-à-vis
the South. Yet, the states of the global south are not monolithically composed of
equally poor countries, a point driven home in the 1980s by the performance of
the Asian tigers. Since 1992, the OECD has permitted the participation of nonmembers in its work, and one of the Asian tigers – South Korea – was admitted to
the OECD in 1996,10 following Mexico,11 admitted in 1994, after it became a
signatory to the North American Free Trade Agreement with Canada and
the United States. The OECD is currently involved in active outreach activities in
East Asia, Latin America, and Africa. This raises questions about the effect of the
expansion of membership on the institution’s attractiveness as a ‘rich country’s
club’, offering a safe venue for the development of common strategies vis-à-vis the
rest of the world.
Not all OECD’s original member states are equal in wealth and power. This
raises the question of whether the OECD is and has always operated as a site for
the exercise of ‘Americanization’. The OECD’s predecessor, the OEEC, was
certainly established to help implement the US Marshall Plan. Its replacement by
the OECD brought the US (and Canada) into what had been a European organization. The OECD’s budget is also based on financial contributions that reflect
the size of each member’s economy. Hence, the US contributes the largest share to
10
See Salzman and Terracino (2006) for an interesting analysis of one of the terms imposed on Korea –
compliance with international labour standards – and OECD’s ineffectiveness in enforcing this.
11
The current Secretary General is a Mexican, Angel Gurria, whom Woodward identifies as a strong
proponent of neo-liberalism.
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the OECD’s budget, followed by Japan. Although the Secretaries General have
come from a variety of countries, one of the Deputy Secretary General posts is
normally occupied by an American.12 More broadly, Dostal (2004) estimated that
of the OECD’s professional staff of 858, Americans (133) were only exceeded
by the French (182).13 Many of these are economists, trained in neo-classical
economics, a discipline in which the US increasingly sets the standard.14 There are
also specific instances where American policies clearly set limits to what the
OECD could do. Thus for instance, Webb’s (2004: 815) analysis of the fate of
the OECD’s ‘harmful tax competition’ treaty concluded that ‘The Bush Administration’s anti-tax ideology had a huge impact on the OECD project even though
that ideology found little official support in any other OECD country’.
Nevertheless, unlike the World Bank and the IMF, the OECD’s headquarters
are in Paris, not in the US. A majority of member states remain European, and
Europeans constitute the majority of its professional staff, a situation that enables
the addition of social democratic ideas to the policy mix, especially with the victories
of Left governments in key European states during the latter half of the 1990s.
In addition, there are strong connections between the European Commission and the
OECD. The European Union is an active participant in many of its committees and
has representation on the Ministerial Council. The two organizations collaborate on
various projects, although the OECD’s longer research involvement around labour
market and social policy issues, and larger staff complement means that it is the
Commission that looks to the OECD rather than the reverse.15
Perhaps, however, the real question is not which member country(s) dominate(s)
the OECD. It is more useful to focus instead on the networks of transnational
governance and the concomitant internationalization of the state. Thus, for Cox
(2005: 232), one consequence of the internationalization of the state is that ‘new
axes of influence link international policy networks with the key central agencies of
government and big business’. It is principally core ministries, such as finance, that
are most strongly linked into dialogue and ‘meditation’ with the OECD, especially
its central components, the Economics Department, and its key committees. Yet,
although while national states may have been penetrated by transnational networks,
they still remain important sites of deliberation and, ultimately, policy decision.
They remain, therefore, more than mere transmission belts for ideas established

12

Initially there were two posts, now there are four, and one of these is occupied by an American.
The US was followed by 90 from the UK, with Canada, Germany, Japan, and Italy accounting for
between 51 and 62 professional staff each.
14
In an earlier era, there were more national schools of economics, for example, the Stockholm
school, where Gunnar Myrdal and others developed an indigenous version of Keynesian analysis; French,
Finnish, and a distinct British school (Joan Robinson and others) (see Hall, 1993). Now the US sets the
standard even in the newer developments (neo-institutional economics – North, etc.).
15
DELSA and the Commission began to cooperate on employment in the late 1990s (Noaksson and
Jacobsson, 2003) and, since the Lisbon process, on social policy too. More recently, they have been
working together on a family database (Email communication with Mark Pearson, 5 April 2007).
13
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elsewhere. Policy learning may be taking place in an increasingly transnational
context, but that learning can involve a creative process in which national states
draw their own conclusions from the lessons learned.

Continuities and discontinuities: from Keynes to neo-liberalism and beyond?
Thus far, we have stressed the central role that ideas play in OECD’s contribution to
transnational governance, and the processes through which it develops and disseminates these. We have not, however, closely examined the question of what sort of
ideas the OECD has developed and supported. Like states in relation to powerful
interests in their own societies, the OECD enjoys a relative autonomy in constructing
ideas, even if, in general, it tends to reflect the ideological tenor of the times. Thus,
until the mid-1970s, the OECD reflected the postwar conventional wisdom of
Keynesianism. Thereafter, the organization gradually came to adopt a different policy
paradigm, generally referred to as monetarism or neo-liberalism, contemporary
renditions of traditional neo-classical economics. Many observers detect some shift in
OECD thinking in recent years. How far it has moved from an earlier neo-liberal
orthodoxy remains a matter of debate and may, in fact, vary by issue area, as a more
detailed discussion of two initiatives – the Jobs Strategy and Babies and Bosses –
suggests. A comparison of the earlier work conducted by the authors suggested that a
discussion of these cases could helpfully identify a degree of ideological variation
within the OECD, expressed by different offices within the organization, themselves
linked to different actors at the member state level, and occupying policy spaces that
are located differently to the central objectives of the OECD. In the concluding
section of this article, we specify hypotheses for future research that were generated
by the comparison.
The OECD’s internal discourse has often been viewed as being dominated by
Anglo-American trained professional economists. As such it can be expected to
reflect trends in economics, especially as taught in the Anglo-American universities and popularized by think tanks based in those countries (Dostal, 2004:
440, 446). That said, the OECD is not one-dimensional and is not merely a
transmission belt for the ideas dominant in economics departments. Different
trends within orthodox economics may be used by different agencies within the
OECD itself. In part, this may reflect their links with different agencies in member
states. Although the Economics Directorate tends to interact closely with national
finance ministries, DELSA engages with ministries dealing with labour and social
issues. To the extent that these transnational networks draw on different trends
within orthodox economics, one might expect to see an ‘inclusive’ liberalism
compared with the hard neo-liberal economics perspective of the Economics
Department. In addition, different directorates develop distinct organizational
discourses, which are reflected in key documents.
The McCracken report marked the beginning of the hegemony of neo-liberalism
within the OECD. Adopting a supply side approach to the labour market, the
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McCracken report’s analyses and prescriptions pointed the way to a new orthodoxy, based on removal of rigidities and enhanced flexibility within the labour
market (McCracken, 1977: 221–223), themes that would figure prominently in
the Jobs Study of the 1990s. Of course, particular member states had already
begun to shift away from the OECD’s earlier discourse. Nonetheless, the
McCracken report formed part of a broader paradigm shift in which the inability
of an existing paradigm to explain discordant evidence and advance solutions to
problems played a part in its replacement.
A later example of the power of economic orthodoxy is provided by the Jobs
Study and Jobs Strategy exercises of the 1990s and early 2000s. The Jobs Study
proved an important document, especially for the organizational discourse of the
influential Economics Department. To a certain extent, the initial Jobs Study
reflected different institutional interests within the OECD, which are themselves
reflective of broader interests and theoretical disputes in society. Initiated in
response to concerns about unemployment, especially in a number of European
member countries, the Jobs Study provided an analysis, which involved several
directorates under the lead of the General Secretariat. Although there was some
effort to recognize the fact that economic flexibility for employers should be
combined with economic security for workers, the document was grounded in
a neo-liberal analysis of labour markets on the basis of the concept of a nonaccelerating rate of unemployment (NAIRU) (McBride and Williams, 2001). The
significance of this theory is that it locates obstacles to non-inflationary employment growth within the labour market itself, rather than deficiencies in aggregate
demand or productive capacity. It therefore provides an economic rationale for
deregulated ‘flexible’ labour markets. Although certainly mainstream by the early
1990s, the doctrine is by no means uncontested within the economics profession
(see Sawyer, 2004).
The original document evolved into the Jobs Strategy, for which the economics
department assumed sole responsibility (Noaksson and Jacobsson, 2003: 17–18).
It typified the department’s neo-liberal discourse and was strongly reflected, inter
alia, in the biennial country surveys discussed in the earlier section. Moreover,
with DELSA no longer closely involved, the desire to balance flexibility with
security gave way to a more pronounced focus on deregulation and flexibility in
the labour force (Noaksson and Jacobsson, 2003: 47–48).
The contrast between selective, theory-driven approaches on the part of
the OECD, emanating from its economics department, and more contextual,
interdisciplinary approaches characteristic of other organizations, is traced in a
comparison of the Jobs Study and the EU’s Employment Strategy. Noaksson
and Jacobsson suggest that: ‘while the EU attempts to adapt knowledge to fit
reality, the OECD attempts to adapt reality to fit existing knowledge’ (2003: 10).
Similarly, Casey points to the greater influence of social considerations on EU
analyses of the labour market: the European strategy reflects greater awareness of
the potentially negative outcomes that can result from following through with
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some of its recommendations. Accordingly, it is more willing to counsel caution,
and more willing to suggest the need for compensatory actions. That it does so is a
corollary of it being influenced by a social model ‘in a way that the OECD
strategy is not’ (Casey, 2004). This would be one reason for non-compliance with
the Jobs Strategy on the part of some countries. The strategy seems to have been
perceived as one that was useful for Finance Ministers in pushing for reforms but,
where social partners were in a position to resist, unlikely to be implemented.
The fact that there was a significant degree of non-compliance with Jobs
Study recommendations, and that those who failed to follow OECD advice often
outperformed those who did (McBride and Williams, 2001), raises questions
about the OECD’s own ability, or at least that of its Economics Department, to
engage in policy learning. Eventually, however, the empirical record of the Jobs
Strategy did force a partial re-evaluation. In 2003, the Employment and Labour
Ministers asked the secretariat to re-assess the entire strategy. This led to the 2006
release of Boosting Jobs and Incomes – Policy Lessons From Reassessing the
OECD Jobs Strategy along with supporting studies in the 2006 Employment
Outlook. One unresolved issue is whether the change(s) represent a new paradigm, distinct from the neo-liberalism that has characterized OECD policy
approaches since the mid-1970s, or whether it represents adjustment, modification, and fine-tuning of that approach, which responds or reacts to criticisms of
the neo-liberal model without sacrificing the fundamentals of that approach?
Since 2006, the OECD has formally recognized that there is more than one
path to good labour market performance. Yet the re-assessment also involved a
new emphasis on ensuring adequate labour supply for the future, rather than
improving the employment rate now. As well, the report stressed the need to
support the knowledge economy through adult skills, and investment in training
that were already pillars of the economic growth platform published in the 2003
OECD Growth Study. Although the 2006 revisions do reflect changes, much of
the analysis and policy advice on how to achieve the new goals remains staunchly
neo-liberal.
The new recommendations clearly favour a more neo-liberal policy framework,
including the familiar litany of removing labour market rigidities, keeping
unemployment and social assistance benefits low, keeping minimum wages low,
and reducing access to long-term disability and early retirement programmes
(OECD, 2006). The proposals also encourage states to remove tax and pension
incentives that encourage people to leave the labour market early, while also
suggesting that income taxes should be reduced to ‘make work pay’. All these
measures are promoted as vital to ensuring that labour markets are competitive
and provide employment even for low productivity workers. They also act to
ensure that the labour market is ‘flexible’ (in the language of the earlier Jobs
Study) for employers. These recommendations thus fit well with the assumptions
and ‘best practices’ put forward by the original Jobs Study and seem to directly
attack the underlying structures of the alternative flexicurity approach.
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In other spheres, triggered by the unpopularity of neo-liberalism around the world,
electoral results in some key European countries, and the European influence on the
Paris-based OECD, the OECD has re-discovered the need for positive social policy,
which reflects a turn towards ‘inclusive liberalism’ (Craig and Porter, 2004). The
latter differs from neo-liberalism in its emphasis on investing in people who show
that they are willing to take responsibility for their own development, providing
‘carrots’ rather than sticks within a supply-side approach, providing incentives to
encourage men to share parental leave, and a range of other ‘positive’ measures.
However, it shares several important assumptions with neo-liberalism: acceptance
of trade and investment liberalization, commitment to non-inflationary growth and
fiscal conservatism, a supply-side approach to employability that stresses ‘flexibility’,
and acceptance of inequality ‘in the here and now’.
Perhaps the best evidence that the OECD – or at least DELSA, one of its
important directorates – is modifying its attachment to neo-liberalism, is in the
area of social policy. This is especially apparent with respect to measures to
promote the ‘reconciliation of work and family life’. In the 1980s, DELSA had
joined in the conversion to neo-liberalism, declaring social expenditures a burden
at its 1980s conference on ‘the crisis of the welfare state’ (Deacon, Hulse, and
Stubbs, 1997). It began to chart a different course, however, with the publication
of New Orientation for Social Policy (1994), in which it declared that reform did
not require cuts to social expenditures, but rather the development of ‘efficient
and effective’ social policies designed to address the new social, economic, and
political realities. In fact, Jenson suggests that it was the OECD that took the lead
in promoting the shift from ‘classical’ neo-liberalism to what she calls the ‘social
investment’ paradigm (2007: 17). In contrast to the postwar ‘social protection’
paradigm that focused on sustaining (male breadwinner) incomes in times of
unemployment, sickness, or retirement, the new paradigm, which we describe as
‘inclusive liberalism’, calls for social policies that facilitate the development of
capacities (human capital) over the course of life.
The new social policy orientation, with its stress on ‘social investment’ and
‘activation’, had an important gender component right from the beginning. The
rise in women’s labour force participation was welcomed for its contribution
to women’s ‘self-realization’ and autonomy, as well as for its economic role.
These benefits, however, posed new challenges, notably by creating demand for
care work traditionally provided within the home. The ideas laid out in New
Orientation were developed through conferences and in-house research, and this
was reflected in A Caring World (1999), which accorded well with inclusive
liberalism’s emphasis on state support for economically active, ‘empowered’
individuals.
The social policy discourse developed by DELSA in the 1990s provided the
theoretical basis for Babies and Bosses, a detailed 13-country comparison of
‘family-friendly’ policies, launched in 2001. It scrutinized tax and benefit policies
to identify disincentives to women’s labour market participation, recommending

98

RIANNE MAHON AND STEPHEN MCBRIDE

the elimination of spousal allowances, and the exemption of lone parents from the
obligation to work. Yet it did not only recommend cuts. In fact, it was quite
prepared to counsel public support for childcare and parental leave (of appropriate length, so as not to contribute to the destruction of human capital).
Moreover, it recognized that it was women whose lives were being changed in the
new ‘family-friendly’ world. Men’s patterns had not changed in most of the
countries examined. Although initially Babies and Bosses saw little possibility of
changing the gender division of labour in the home, by the final volume it had
come to recognize that genuinely family-friendly policies had to include measures
to change this. Its commitment to greater gender equality is visible in the new
family database, which includes items such as pay gaps between full and part
time (mainly female) workers, male and female earnings, sectoral/occupational
concentration by gender, and the gender distribution of child care leave.
Babies have laid the groundwork for the ongoing evaluation of the member
countries’ family-friendly policies. Nevertheless, the realization of gender equality,
not to mention class equality, will remain limited as long as states are constrained to
operate within tight fiscal parameters and as long as flexible labour markets, even of
the ‘flexicurity’ variety accepted in the Revised Job Strategy, are the idea. Thus,
although DELSA’s social policy discourse can be seen as evidence of a turn to
inclusive liberalism, it is the very assumptions that it shares with its neo-liberal
counterpart, especially the commitment to flexible labour markets, which limit its
progressive character. In other words, it does not challenge the existence of evermore polarized labour markets but only seeks to make it possible for individuals to
escape the ‘poverty bus’.

Conclusions
One thread running through this analysis is that the OECD represents an
important but under-emphasized node in the growing networks of transnational
governance. In fact, it has pioneered the inquisitive and meditative forms that
other inter- and supranational organizations have more recently discovered. The
studies it conducts not only feed into policy discussions in other international
fora, such as the G-8 and WTO, but its reports also infiltrate national debates,
often from privileged locations within them, such as Ministries of Finance, where
the aura of expertise surrounding the OECD may be used by national and subnational actors who seek to advance the broader neo-liberal agenda. Nevertheless,
in times of transition and marked contestation such as these, the OECD is far
from monolithic. Different ideological and policy currents may find expression in,
and even result in, conflict among different branches of the organization, opening
up the possibility that actors seeking alternatives to neo-liberalism may draw on
the OECD’s prestige for their own purposes.
Just how much does the OECD deviate from the neo-liberal consensus that
has predominated in the major IOs such as the IMF and the World Bank since the
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1980s? Clearly, detectable changes are underway at the OECD. Do these reflect
the emergence of an alternative paradigm? Certainly, DELSA’s ‘inclusive liberalism’
is distinct from the neo-liberalism that remains dominant within other sections of the
OECD, notably its Economics Department. It does not, however, challenge the
fundamentals, especially as these concern the drive for flexible labour markets,
which has contributed to employment and income polarization in many of the
OECD member countries. The revised (2006) Jobs Strategy belatedly accepts that
there is another route to ‘good’ labour market performance and international
competitiveness other than that recommended by the original Jobs Study. Nevertheless, the new Jobs Strategy continues to reflect neo-liberal goals and policy
instruments, an indication that any change in direction is one of adjustment rather
than transformation. That said, it is clear that the OECD provides a forum in which
officials from member states, the OECD’s own expert staff and, to a certain extent,
selected representatives of civil society can actively construct transnational policy
ideas. If their deliberations reflect the prevailing paradigm, it is also true, as the
Babies and Bosses case makes clear, that the construction of alternatives and
adjustments is also represented within the organization.
We selected the Jobs Strategy and Babies and Bosses for a more detailed
analysis for several reasons. First, they show that the OECD is not a monolithic
organization. The Jobs Strategy remains largely informed by the tenets of neoliberalism, whereas Babies and Bosses shows some movement towards a more
inclusive form of liberalism. Second, the fact that these two examples stand on
potential fissures within the OECD enabled us to consider several hypotheses that
might figure in future research on that organization. These are: the more central
an area to the OECD’s core economic functions, the more likely OECD recommendations are to reflect the dominant economic paradigm; the more an area
involves interaction between the OECD Economics Department and national
economic ministries, the more likely it is to reflect neo-liberal policy prescriptions.
Conversely, the more remote an area is from core OECD economic functions,
and the more likely it is to involve collaboration between DELSA and national
social policy ministries, the more open it may be to alternative discourses. There
seems, however, to be an hierarchy of priorities within the OECD, as well as in
its member states, in which economic imperatives for the most part outweigh
those represented by other portfolios. The latter may have room to differentiate
themselves from the main economic message, but are constrained to frame alternatives in ways that contribute to, rather than contradict, the dominant economic
paradigm.
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